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Performance, liquidity, and policy intervention
Diego Moreno
Departament of Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
John Wooders
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We study nonstationary dynamic decentralized markets with adverse selection
in which trade is bilateral and prices are determined by bargaining. Examples
include labor markets, housing markets, and markets for financial assets. We
characterize equilibrium, and identify the dynamics of transaction prices, trad-
ing patterns, and the average quality in the market. When the horizon is finite,
the surplus in the unique equilibrium exceeds the competitive surplus; as traders
become perfectly patient, the market becomes completely illiquid at all but the
first and last dates, but the surplus remains above the competitive surplus. When
the horizon is infinite, the surplus realized equals the static competitive surplus.
We study policies aimed at improving market performance, and show that sub-
sidies to low quality or to trades at a low price, taxes on high quality, restrictions
on trading opportunities, or government purchases may raise the surplus. In con-
trast, interventions like the Public–Private Investment Program for Legacy Assets
reduce the surplus when traders are patient.
Keywords. Adverse selection, decentralized trade, liquidity, PPIP.
JEL classification. C73, C78, D82.
1. Introduction
We study the performance of decentralized markets for lemons in which trade is bilat-
eral and time-consuming, and buyers and sellers bargain over prices. These features
are common in markets for real goods and financial assets. We characterize the unique
decentralized market equilibrium, identify the dynamics of transaction prices, trading
patterns, and the market composition (i.e., the fractions of units of the different qualities
in the market), and study its asymptotic properties as traders become perfectly patient.
Using our characterization of market equilibrium, we identify policy interventions that
are welfare improving.
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We consider markets in which sellers are privately informed about the quality of the
good they hold, which may be high or low, and buyers are homogeneous and value each
quality more highly than sellers. Since we are interested in understanding dynamic trad-
ing when the lemons problem is severe, we assume that the expected value to buyers of
a random unit is below the cost of a high quality unit.1 The market operates over a num-
ber of consecutive dates. All buyers and sellers are present at the market open, and there
is no further entry. At each date a fraction of the buyers and sellers remaining in the
market are randomly paired. In every pair, the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it price
offer. If the seller accepts, then the agents trade at that price and exit the market. If the
seller rejects the offer, then the agents split and both remain in the market at the next
date. There are trading frictions since meeting a partner is time-consuming and traders
discount future gains.
In this market, equilibrium dynamics are nonstationary and involve a delicate bal-
ance: At each date, buyers’ price offers must be optimal given the sellers’ reservation
prices, the market composition, and the buyers’ payoff to remaining in the market.
While the market composition is determined by past price offers, the sellers’ reserva-
tion prices are determined by future price offers. Thus, a market equilibrium cannot be
computed recursively.
We begin by studying the equilibria of decentralized markets that open over a finite
horizon. Perishable goods such as fresh fruit or event tickets, as well as financial assets
such as (put or call) options or 30-year bonds are noteworthy examples. We show that if
frictions are not large, then equilibrium is unique, and we calculate it explicitly. The key
features of equilibrium dynamics are as follows: at the first date, both a low price (ac-
cepted only by low quality sellers) and negligible prices (rejected by both types of sellers)
are offered; at the last date, both a high price (accepted by both types of sellers) and a
low price are offered; and at all the intervening dates, all three types of prices—high, low,
and negligible—are offered. Interestingly, as the traders’ discount factor approaches 1,
there is trade only at the first and last two dates, and the market is completely illiquid at
all intervening dates.
In contrast to the competitive equilibrium, low quality trades with delay and high
quality trades. The surplus realized in the decentralized market equilibrium exceeds the
surplus realized in the competitive equilibrium: as we show, the gain realized from trad-
ing high quality units more than offsets the loss resulting from trading low quality units
with delay. The surplus realized increases as frictions decrease, and thus a decentral-
ized market open over an finite horizon yields more than the competitive surplus (and
traders’ payoffs are not competitive) even in the limit as frictions vanish. Holding market
frictions fixed, the surplus decreases as the horizon becomes larger.
As the horizon approaches infinity, the trading dynamics become simple: at the first
date buyers make low and negligible price offers (hence only some low quality sellers
1Under this assumption, as Akerlof (1970) shows, the unique static competitive equilibrium is ineffi-
cient as only low quality trades, and the entire surplus is captured by low quality sellers. We take the
payoffs and surplus at this static competitive equilibrium as the competitive benchmark. (We study dy-
namic competitive equilibrium in the Supplement, available in a supplementary file on the journal website,
http://econtheory.org/supp/1631/supplement.pdf.)
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trade), and at every date thereafter buyers make only high and negligible price offers in
proportions that do not change over time. In contrast to prior results in the literature,
in this limiting equilibrium each trader obtains his competitive payoff, and the com-
petitive surplus is realized even when frictions are significant. Moreover, all units trade
eventually, and therefore the surplus lost due to trading low quality with delay exactly
equals the surplus realized from trading high quality.
Our characterization of decentralized market equilibrium yields insights into the ef-
fectiveness of policies designed to increase market efficiency and market liquidity. We
take the liquidity of a good to be the ease with which it is sold, i.e., the equilibrium prob-
ability it trades. In markets that open over a finite horizon, the liquidity of high qual-
ity decreases as traders become more patient and, somewhat counterintuitively, as the
probability of meeting a partner increases. Indeed, as the discount factor approaches
1, trade freezes at all but the first and the last two dates. In markets that open over an
infinite horizon, the liquidity of each quality decreases as traders become more patient,
and is unaffected by the probability of meeting a partner.
We examine the impact on the market equilibrium of a variety of policies. Taxes and
subsidies conditional on the quality of the good may alleviate or aggravate the adverse
selection problem. When the horizon is finite, providing a subsidy to buyers or sellers
of low quality raises the (net) surplus, although a subsidy to buyers has a greater im-
pact. In contrast, a subsidy to either buyers or sellers of high quality tends to reduce
the net surplus: it does so unambiguously when traders are sufficiently patient. Regard-
ing liquidity, a subsidy to buyers or sellers of low quality increases the liquidity of high
quality, whereas a subsidy to buyers of high quality has the opposite effect. Remarkably,
when the horizon is infinite, a tax on high quality raises revenue without affecting either
payoffs or surplus, and hence increases the net surplus.
We also study subsidies conditional on the price at which the good trades. We show
that a subsidy conditional on trading at a low price increases the traders’ payoffs as well
as the net surplus. When the horizon is infinite the subsidy increases the liquidity of
both qualities after the first date, as well as the net surplus. A subsidy conditional on
trading at the high price increases (decreases) the payoffs of buyers (low quality sell-
ers). Interestingly, the liquidity of high quality decreases. When the horizon is infinite,
a subsidy is purely wasteful, whereas a tax raises revenue without affecting payoffs, thus
raising the net surplus.
In our setting, a public–private investment program (PPIP) such as the one imple-
mented for legacy assets is effectively a subsidy to buyers who purchase a low quality
unit at the high price. We show that a PPIP has effects analogous to subsidizing buyers
of high quality: it increases the payoff of buyers and the surplus, decreases the payoff of
low quality sellers and the liquidity of high quality, and, as δ approaches 1 reduces the
net surplus.
We study the effect of closing the market for some period of time. Such policies have
been studied in the literature; e.g., Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2013) study it in a dynamic
competitive setting. Our characterization of the market equilibrium shows that reducing
the horizon over which the market opens (as long as the market remains open for at
least two dates) increases payoffs and surplus. We show that if the horizon is not too
604 Moreno and Wooders Theoretical Economics 11 (2016)
long relative to the traders’ discount factor, then closing the market at all dates except
the first and the last has no effect on payoffs and surplus. If the horizon is long, however,
by closing the market for some period of time, separating market equilibria emerge in
which the surplus is larger than when the market is open at all dates.
Finally, we show that government purchases increase the payoff of low quality sellers
and decrease the payoff of buyers; surplus increases provided the government values
low quality nearly as highly as buyers, but decreases otherwise.
Related literature
The recent financial crisis has stimulated interest in understanding the effects of ad-
verse selection in decentralized markets. Moreno and Wooders (2010) studies markets
with stationary entry and shows that payoffs are competitive as frictions vanish. In their
setting, and in the present paper, traders observe only their own personal histories. Kim
(2012) studies a continuous time version of the model of Moreno and Wooders (2010),
and shows that if frictions are small and buyers observe the amount of time that sellers
have been in the market, then market efficiency improves, whereas if buyers observe
the number of prior offers sellers have rejected, then efficiency is reduced. Thus, Kim’s
(2012) results reveal that increased transparency is not necessarily efficiency enhancing,
and call for caution when regulating information disclosure. Bilancini and Boncinelli
(2012) study a market for lemons with finitely many buyers and sellers, and show that if
the number of sellers in the market is public information, then in equilibrium all units
trade in finite time.
For markets with one-time entry, the focus of the present paper, Blouin (2003) stud-
ies a market open over an infinite horizon in which only one of three exogenously given
prices may emerge from bargaining. Blouin (2003) shows that equilibrium payoffs are
not competitive even as frictions vanish.2 Although we address a broader set of ques-
tions, on this issue we find that payoffs are competitive even when frictions are nonneg-
ligible.
Camargo and Lester (2014) studies a model in which agents’ discount factors are ran-
domly drawn at each date from a distribution whose support is bounded away from 1,
and buyers may make only one of two exogenously given price offers. It shows that in
every equilibrium both qualities trade in finite time. Moreover, liquidity, i.e., the fraction
of buyers offering the high price, increases with the fraction of high quality sellers ini-
tially in the market. In contrast, in our model the unique equilibrium exhibits neither of
these features: a positive measure of high quality remains in the market at all times, and
marginal changes in the fraction of high quality only affect the liquidity of low quality
at date 1. Camargo and Lester (2014) also provides a numerical example demonstrating
that a PPIP subsidy has an ambiguous impact on liquidity as measured by the minimum
time at which the market clears (taken over the set of all equilibria). We show that in our
setting this policy decreases the liquidity of high quality, and we are able to evaluate its
welfare effects.
2See Moreno and Wooders (2001) for the homogeneous goods case.
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In contrast to Blouin (2003) and Camargo and Lester (2014) our model imposes no
restriction on admissible price offers. Moreover, equilibrium is unique and is character-
ized in closed form, which allows for a direct comparative static analysis of the effect of
changes in the parameter values on payoffs, social surplus, and liquidity.
The first paper to consider a matching model with adverse selection is Williamson
and Wright (1994), who show that money can increase welfare. Inderst and Müller (2002)
show that the lemons problem may be mitigated if sellers can sort themselves into differ-
ent submarkets. Inderst (2005) studies a model where agents bargain over contracts, and
shows that separating contracts always emerge in equilibrium. Cho and Matsui (2012)
study long term relationships in markets with adverse selection and show that unem-
ployment and vacancy do not vanish even as search frictions vanish. In their model,
agents respond strategically to price proposals that are drawn from a uniform distri-
bution. Lauermann and Wolinsky (2016) explore the role of trading rules in a search
model with adverse selection, and show that information is aggregated more effectively
in auctions than under sequential search by an informed buyer.
Our work also relates to a literature that examines the mini–micro foundations of
competitive equilibrium. This literature has established that decentralized trade of ho-
mogeneous goods tends to yield competitive outcomes when trading frictions vanish.
See, for example, Gale (1987, 1996) or Binmore and Herrero (1988) when bargaining is
under complete information, and Moreno and Wooders (2002) and Serrano (2002) when
bargaining is under incomplete information.
There is also a growing literature studying dynamic competitive (centralized) mar-
kets with adverse selection. Janssen and Roy (2002) study a market that operates in dis-
crete time and in which there is a continuum of qualities, and show that competitive
equilibria may involve intermediate dates without trade before the market clears in fi-
nite time.3  Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2013) study a market that operates in continuous time,
and show that interrupting trade always raises surplus, while infrequent trade generates
more surplus under some conditions. Philippon and Skreta (2012) and Tirole (2012) ex-
amine optimal government interventions in asset markets. In the Appendix we study the
properties of dynamic competitive equilibria in our setting, compare the performance
of centralized and decentralized markets, and discuss the differential effects of policy
interventions.
2. A decentralized market for lemons
Consider a market for an indivisible commodity whose quality can be either high (H)
or low (L). There is a positive measure of buyers and sellers. The measure of sellers
with a unit of quality τ ∈ {HL} is mτ > 0. For simplicity, we assume that the measure of
buyers (mB) is equal to the measure of sellers, i.e., mB = mH + mL.4 Each buyer wants
to purchase a single unit of the good. Each seller owns a single unit of the good. A seller
knows the quality of his good, but quality is unobservable to buyers prior to purchase.
3See Wooders (1998) for the homogeneous goods case
4This assumption, which is standard in the literature (e.g., it is made in all the related papers discussed in
the Introduction), simplifies the analysis. With unequal measures the matching probability is endogenous
and varies over time. We discuss this issue in Section 4, in connection to the impact of government asset
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Preferences are characterized by values and costs: the value to a buyer of a unit of
high (low) quality is uH (uL); the cost to a seller of a unit of high (low) quality is cH (cL).
Thus, if a buyer and a seller trade at price p, the buyer obtains a utility of u − p and
the seller obtains a utility of p− c, where u = uH and c = cH if the unit traded is of high
quality, and u= uL and c = cL if it is of low quality. A buyer or seller who does not trade
obtains a utility of zero.
We assume that both buyers and sellers value high quality more than low quality
(i.e., uH > uL and cH > cL), and that buyers value each quality more highly than sellers
(i.e., uH > cH and uL > cL). Also we restrict attention to markets in which the lemons
problem is severe; that is, we assume that the fraction of sellers of τ quality in the market,
denoted by
qτ := m
τ
mH +mL 
is such that the expected value to a buyer of a randomly selected unit of the good, given
by
u(qH) := qHuH + (1− qH)uL
is below the cost of high quality, cH . Equivalently, we may state this assumption as
qH < q¯ := c
H − uL
uH − uL 
Note that qH < q¯ implies cH > uL.
Therefore, we assume throughout that uH > cH > uL > cL and qH < q¯. Under these
parameter restrictions only low quality trades in the unique static competitive equilib-
rium, even though there are gains to trade for both qualities. For future reference, we
describe this equilibrium in Remark 1 below.
Remark 1. The market has a unique static competitive equilibrium. In equilibrium all
low quality units trade at the price uL, and no high quality unit trades. Thus, the surplus,
given by
S¯ =mL(uL − cL)
is captured by low quality sellers.
In our model of decentralized trade, the market is open for T consecutive dates. All
traders are present at the market open, and there is no further entry. Traders discount
utility at a common rate δ ∈ (01], i.e., if at date t a unit of quality τ trades at price p, then
the buyer obtains a utility of δt−1(uτ −p) and the seller obtains a utility of δt−1(p− cτ).
At each date every buyer (seller) in the market meets a randomly selected seller (buyer)
purchases. Also, with this assumption first best efficiency is achieved when all units trade, and the competi-
tive equilibrium is inefficient when adverse selection is severe, with unequal measures the characterization
of first best efficiency depends on the relative gains to trade of high and low quality, uH − cH and uL − cL,
and the competitive equilibrium may be efficient even when adverse selection is severe.
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with probability α ∈ (01]. In each pair, the buyer offers a price at which to trade. If the
offer is accepted by the seller, then the agents trade and both leave the market. If the
offer is rejected by the seller, then the agents split and both remain in the market at the
next date. A trader who is unmatched at the current date also remains in the market at
the next date. An agent observes only the outcomes of his own matches.
In this market, the behavior of buyers at each date t may be described by a cumula-
tive distribution function (c.d.f.) λt with support in R+ specifying a probability distribu-
tion over price offers. Likewise, the behavior of sellers of each quality is described by a
probability distribution with support on R+ specifying their reservation prices. Given a
sequence λ= (λ1     λT ) describing buyers’ price offers, the maximum expected utility
of a seller of quality τ ∈ {HL} at date t ∈ {1    T } is defined recursively as
V τt = max
x∈R+
{
α
∫ ∞
x
(p− cτ)dλt(p)+
(
1− α
∫ ∞
x
dλt(p)
)
δV τt+1
}

where V τT+1 = 0. In this expression, the payoff to a seller of quality τ who receives a price
offer p is p − cτ if p is at least his reservation price x, and it is δV τt+1, his continuation
utility, otherwise. Since all sellers of quality τ have the same maximum expected utility,
then their equilibrium reservation prices are identical. Therefore we restrict attention to
strategy distributions in which all sellers of quality τ ∈ {HL} use the same sequence of
reservation prices rτ = (rτ1      rτT ) ∈RT+.
Let (λ rH rL)be a strategy distribution. For t ∈ {1    T }, the probability that a
matched seller of quality τ ∈ {HL} trades, denoted by λτt , is
λτt =
∫ ∞
rτt
dλt(p)
The stock of sellers of quality τ in the market at date t + 1, denoted by mτt+1, is
mτt+1 = (1− αλτt )mτt 
where mτ1 =mτ . The fraction of sellers of high quality in the market at date t, denoted by
qHt , is
qHt =
mHt
mHt +mLt
if mHt + mLt > 0, and qHt ∈ [01] is arbitrary otherwise.5 The fraction of sellers of low
quality in the market at date t, denoted by qLt , is
qLt = 1− qHt 
The maximum expected utility of a buyer at date t ∈ {1    T } is defined recursively as
V Bt = max
x∈R+
{
α
∑
τ∈{HL}
qτt I(x r
τ
t )(u
τ − x)+
(
1− α
∑
τ∈{HL}
qτt I(x r
τ
t )
)
δV Bt+1
}

5Evaluating payoffs requires specifying a value for qHt for all t. Lemma 2, part L2.1, implies that m
H
t > 0
for all t, and thus how qHt is specified when m
H
t +mLt = 0 does not affect equilibrium.
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where V BT+1 = 0. Here I(x y) is the indicator function whose value is 1 if x ≥ y and is
0 otherwise. In this expression, the payoff to a buyer who offers the price x is uτ − x
when matched to a τ-quality seller who accepts the offer (i.e., when I(x rτt ) = 1), and it
is δV Bt+1, her continuation utility, otherwise.
Definition. A strategy distribution (λ rH rL) is a decentralized market equilibrium
(DME) if for each t ∈ {1    T },
rτt − cτ = δV τt+1 (DME.τ)
for τ ∈ {HL}, and for almost all p in the support of λt ,
α
∑
τ∈{HL}
qτt I(p r
τ
t )(u
τ −p)+
(
1− α
∑
τ∈{HL}
qτt I(p r
τ
t )
)
δV Bt+1 = V Bt  (DME.B)
Condition (DME.τ) ensures that each type τ seller is indifferent between accepting
or rejecting an offer of his reservation price. Condition (DME.B) ensures that price offers
that are made with positive probability are optimal.
The surplus realized in a decentralized market equilibrium can be calculated as
SDME =mBV B1 +mHV H1 +mLV L1 
Another feature of the market equilibrium worth identifying is the liquidity of each
good, i.e., how easily each good can be bought or sold. In our setting, we define the
liquidities of high and low quality at each date t to be the equilibrium probabilities that
these goods trade, which are given by αρHt and α(ρ
H
t + ρLt ), respectively.
3. Decentralized market equilibrium
Proposition 1 establishes basic properties of decentralized market equilibria.
Proposition 1. Assume that T <∞ and δ < 1. EveryDMEhas the following properties:
(P1.1) At every date t ∈ {1    T } we have rHt = cH > rLt , V Ht = 0, and qHt+1 ≥ qHt .
(P1.2) At every date t ∈ {1    T }, only the high price pt = rHt , or the low price pt = rLt ,
or negligible prices pt < rLt may be offered with positive probability.
The intuition for these results is straightforward. Since the payoff of a seller who does
not trade at date T is zero, sellers’ reservation prices at date T are equal to their costs,
i.e., rτT = cτ . Thus, price offers above cH are suboptimal at date T , and are made with
probability 0. Therefore the expected utility of high quality sellers at date T is zero, i.e.,
V HT = 0, and hence rHT−1 = cH . Also, since δ < 1, i.e., delay is costly, low quality sellers
accept price offers below cH , i.e., rLT−1 < c
H . A simple induction argument shows that
rHt = cH > rLt for all t.
Obviously, prices above rHt , which are accepted by both types of sellers, or prices in
the interval (rLt  r
H
t ), which are accepted only by low quality sellers, are suboptimal, and
Theoretical Economics 11 (2016) Dynamic markets for lemons 609
are therefore made with probability 0. Moreover, since rHt > r
L
t , then the proportion of
high quality sellers in the market (weakly) increases over time (i.e., qHt+1 ≥ qHt ) as low
quality sellers accept offers of both rHt and r
L
t , and therefore exit the market at least as
fast as high quality sellers, who only accept offers of rHt .
In equilibrium, at each date a buyer may offer a high price p= rHt , which is accepted
by both types of sellers, or a low price p = rLt , which is accepted by low quality sellers
and rejected by high quality sellers, or a negligible price p< rLt , which is rejected by both
types of sellers. For τ ∈ {HL} denote by ρτt the probability of a price offer equal to rτt .
Since prices greater than rHt are offered with probability 0, the probability of a high price
offer is ρHt = λHt . (Recall that λτt is the probability that a matched τ-quality seller trades
at date t.) And since prices in the interval (rLt  r
H
t ) are offered with probability 0, then
the probability of a low price offer is ρLt = λLt − λHt . Thus, the probability of a negligible
price offer is 1− (ρHt + ρLt )= 1− λLt .
Proposition 1 thus allows a simpler description of a DME. Henceforth we describe a
DME by a collection (ρHρL rL), where ρτ = (ρτ1     ρτT ) for τ ∈ {HL}, and thus ignore
the distribution of negligible price offers, which is inconsequential. Also we omit the
reservation price of high quality sellers which is rHt = cH for all t by P1.1.
Proposition 2 establishes additional properties of DME.
Proposition 2. Assume that T <∞ and δ < 1. EveryDMEhas the following properties:
(P2.1) At every date t ∈ {1    T } either high or low prices are offered with positive
probability, i.e., ρHt + ρLt > 0.
(P2.2) At date 1 high prices are offered with probability 0, i.e., ρH1 = 0.
(P2.3) At date T negligible prices are offered with probability 0, i.e., 1− ρHT − ρLT = 0.
The intuition for P2.2 is clear: Since at date 1 the expected utility of a random unit
is less than cH by assumption, then high price offers are suboptimal, i.e., ρH1 = 0. The
intuition for P2.3 is also simple: At date T the sellers’ reservation prices are equal to
their costs. Thus, buyers obtain a positive payoff by offering either the low price rLT = cL
(when qHT < 1), or the high price r
H
T = cH (when qHT = 1). Since a buyer who does not
trade obtains zero, then negligible price offers are suboptimal, i.e., ρHT + ρLT = 1. The
intuition for P2.1 is as follows: Suppose to the contrary that all buyers make negligible
offers at date t, i.e., ρHt = ρLt = 0. Let t ′ be the first date following t where a buyer makes a
nonnegligible price offer. Since there is no trade between t and t ′, then the distribution
of qualities is the same at t and t ′, i.e., qHt = qHt ′ . Thus, an impatient buyer is better off
by offering at date t the price she offers at t ′, which implies that negligible prices are
suboptimal at t; i.e., ρHt + ρLt = 1. Hence ρHt > 0 and/or ρLt > 0.
In a market that opens for a single date, i.e., T = 1, the sellers’ reservation prices are
their costs. The fraction of high quality sellers,
qˆ := c
H − cL
uH − cL 
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makes a buyer indifferent between an offer of cH and an offer of cL. It is easy to see that
q¯ < qˆ. Since qH < q¯ by assumption, then qH < qˆ. Thus, if T = 1 only low price offers are
made (i.e., ρH1 = 0 and ρL1 = 1) and only low quality trades, as implied by P2.1 and P2.2.
Remark 2 states these results.
Remark 2. Assume that T = 1 and δ < 1. Then the unique DME is (ρH1 ρL1  rL1 ) =
(01 cL). In equilibrium some low quality units trade at the price cL, and no high quality
unit trades. Thus, the surplus realized, which is αmL(uL − cL), is captured by buyers.
Proposition 3 below establishes that when frictions are not large a decentralized
market that opens over a finite horizon T > 1 has a unique DME. We say that frictions
are not large when α and δ are sufficiently near 1 that the following inequalities hold:
ρ¯
αδ
<min
{
cH − uL
(1+ αδ)(1− δ)(cH − cL)1
}
(F.1)
and
(1− ρ¯/δ)qH
(1− ρ¯/δ)qH + (1− α)(1− qH) > qˆ (F.2)
where
ρ¯ := u
L − cL
cH − cL 
Inequality (F.1) requires α and δ be sufficiently close to 1 that a low quality seller
prefers to wait one period and trade with probability α at the price cH rather than trading
immediately at the price uL. The left hand side of (F.1), ρ¯/(αδ), is an upper bound of the
probability that a high price is offered at any date as we show in the proof of Lemma 2,
part L2.6, in the Supplement, available in a supplementary file on the journal website,
http://econtheory.org/supp/1631/supplement.pdf. It is easy to see that (F.1) holds for α
and δ near 1.
Inequality (F.2) requires that if all matched low quality sellers trade and at most a
fraction ρ¯/(αδ) of matched high quality sellers trade, then the fraction of high quality
sellers in the market at the next date is above qˆ. In the proof of Lemma 2, part L2.2, in
the Supplement we show that this inequality implies that the low price is never offered
with probability 1. Obviously, this inequality holds for α near 1.
Write
φ¯ := (1− qˆ)(uL − cL)
and for t ∈ {1    T } let
φt = αδT−t φ¯
Clearly φt is increasing in α and δ, and approaches αφ¯ as δ approaches 1; and φt is
decreasing in T , and approaches 0 as T approaches infinity.
Proposition 3 establishes that when frictions are not large a market that opens over
a finite horizon has a unique DME, and provides a complete characterization of this
equilibrium.
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Proposition 3. Assume that 1< T <∞, δ < 1, and inequalities (F.1) and (F.2) hold (i.e.,
frictions are not large). The unique DME is given by the following formulae:
(P3.1) High price offers are made with probabilities ρH1 = 0,
ρHt =
1− δ
αδ
uL − cL
cH − uL +φt
for all 1< t < T , and
ρHT =
uL − cL − αδφ¯
αδ(cH − cL) 
(P3.2) Low price offers are made with probabilities
ρL1 =
φ2 + cH − u(qH)
α(1− qH)(cH − uL +φ2)
and ρLT = 1− ρHT . If T > 2, then
ρLt = (1− αρHt )
(1− δ)φt+1
α(cH − uL +φt+1)
uH − uL
uH − cH −φt
for all 1< t < T − 1, and
ρLT−1 = (1− αρHT−1)
(1− αδ)(u(qˆ)− cH)
αqˆ(uH − cH −φT−1) 
(P3.3) Reservation prices are rLt = uL −φt for all t < T , and rLT = cL.
In equilibrium, the payoff to a buyer is V B1 =φ1, and the payoffs to sellers are V H1 = 0 and
V L1 = uL − cL − φ1. Thus, the payoff to a buyer (low quality seller) is above (below) his
competitive payoff, decreases (increases) with T , and increases (decreases) with α and δ.
The surplus, which is given by
SDME =mL(uL − cL)+mHαδT−1φ¯
is above the competitive surplus S¯, decreaseswith T , and increaseswithα and δ. Moreover,
the liquidity of high quality decreases with α and δ.
It is easy to describe the equilibrium trading patterns: at the first date only low and
negligible prices are offered, and thus some low quality sellers trade, but no high qual-
ity seller trades (i.e., ρH1 = 0 < ρL1 < 1). At intermediate dates, high, low, and negligible
prices are offered (i.e., ρHt ρ
L
t > 0 and 1 − ρHt − ρLt > 0), and thus some sellers of both
types trade. At the last date only high and low prices are offered (i.e., ρHT + ρLT = 1), and
thus all matched low quality sellers and some high quality sellers trade.
Thus, both qualities trade with delay. Nevertheless, the surplus generated in the
DME is greater than the competitive equilibrium surplus, S¯: the gain from trading high
quality units more than offsets the loss from trading low quality units with delay. In
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contrast, in a market for a homogenous good the competitive equilibrium surplus is an
upper bound to the surplus that can be realized in a DME; e.g., Moreno and Wooders
(2002) show that this bound is achieved as frictions vanish.
Price dispersion is a key feature of equilibrium: At every date but the first there is
trade at more than one price since both high and low prices are offered with positive
probability. To see that price dispersion is essential, suppose instead that the high price
cH is offered with probability 1 at some date t. Since α and δ are near 1, this implies
that the reservation price of low quality sellers prior to t is near cH , and hence above the
value of low quality uL (recall that uL < cH ). Thus, prior to t a low price offer (which
if accepted buys a unit of low quality) is suboptimal, and therefore low price offers are
made with probability 0. Therefore sellers of both qualities leave the market at the same
rate, and hence the fraction of high quality sellers remains constant, i.e., qHt = qH . Since
qH < q¯, a high price offer is suboptimal at t, which is a contradiction. Hence high price
offers are made with probability less than 1 at every date.
Likewise, suppose that the low price is offered with probability 1 at some date t. Then
at date t all matched low quality sellers trade, and no high quality seller trades. Since α
is near 1, this implies that the fraction of high quality sellers in the market at date t + 1 is
near 1, and since this sequence is nondecreasing over time, the fraction of high quality
sellers at the last date is above qˆ. (Recall that qˆ is the fraction of high quality sellers that
makes buyers indifferent between offering the high and the low price at date T .) This
implies that offering cH is uniquely optimal and hence the high price is offered with
probability 1 at date T , which is a contradiction. Thus, low price offers are made with
probability less than 1 at every date.
A more involved argument establishes that all three types of price offers (high, low,
and negligible) are made with positive probability at every date except the first and last;
see the proof of Lemma 2, part L2.7, in the Supplement.
Identifying the probabilities (ρHt ρ
L
t ) is delicate: Their past values determine the
current market composition, qHt , and their future values determine the reservation price
of low quality sellers at date t. In equilibrium, at intermediate dates the market compo-
sition and the sellers’ reservation prices must make buyers indifferent between offering
high, low, or negligible prices, i.e., the equation
u(qHt )− cH = (1− qHt )(uL − rLt )+ qHt δV Bt+1 = δV Bt+1
holds. We show in the proof of Proposition 3 in the Appendix that the system formed
by these equations (together with the analogous equations for dates 1 and T , and the
boundary conditions) admits a single solution. Establishing uniqueness of equilibrium
requires showing that these properties are common to all market equilibria; see the
proof of Lemma 2 in the Supplement.
The comparative static properties of equilibrium relative to α, δ, and T are intuitive:
Since negligible price offers are optimal at every date except the last, the payoff to buy-
ers is just their discounted payoff at the last date. Consequently, the payoff to a buyer
increases with α and δ, and decreases with T . Low quality sellers capture surplus when-
ever high price offers are made, i.e., at every date except the first. The probability of a
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high price offer decreases with both α and δ, and increases with T , and thus the payoff
to low quality sellers decreases with α and δ, and increases with T . The surplus increases
with α and δ. Also, high quality is less liquid as the probability of meeting a partner in-
creases or as traders become more patient. (Indeed, both qualities become completely
illiquid at intermediate dates as δ approaches 1; see Proposition 4 below.)
Somewhat counterintuitively, the surplus decreases with T , i.e., shortening the hori-
zon over which the market opens is advantageous (as long as T > 2): Our assumption
that frictions are small implies that in equilibrium buyers must be willing to offer negli-
gible prices at every date but the last date. Hence their payoff is just their discounted ex-
pected utility at the last date.6 Thus, a longer horizon provides no advantage in screen-
ing sellers, and reduces the buyers’ payoff. The payoff to low quality sellers increases
with T because the high price is offered with higher probability at every date (except at
the last date, at which it is offered with a probability independent of T ). Further, since
buyers’ must remain willing to offer the low price, the increase in the payoff of low qual-
ity sellers exactly matches the decrease in the payoff of buyers. Therefore the surplus
decreases with T since there are more buyers than low quality sellers, and is maximal
when T = 2.
A striking feature of equilibrium in decentralized markets is that the surplus real-
ized exceeds the competitive equilibrium surplus: decentralized markets are more ef-
ficient than centralized ones. While in a centralized market all units trade at a single
market-clearing price, in a decentralized market several prices are offered with positive
probability, and different units trade at different prices. When α = 1, for example, low
quality units trade for sure—some at the high price and some at the low price—while
high quality units trade with probability less than 1. Thus decentralized trade generates
an allocation closer to the surplus maximizing allocation, in which low quality sellers
trade for sure, and high quality sellers trade with positive probability (less than 1).7
Proposition 4 identifies the limiting DME as traders become perfectly patient. A re-
markable feature of the limiting equilibrium is that the market freezes at intermediate
dates, and both qualities are completely illiquid: Low quality trades at the first and last
two dates, and high quality trades only at the last date. The surplus is independent of
the duration of the market.
Proposition 4. Assume that 1< T <∞, δ < 1, and inequalities (F.1) and (F.2) hold (i.e.,
frictions are not large). As δ approaches 1 the unique DME approaches (ρ˜H ρ˜L r˜L) given
by the following formulae:
6In contrast, if traders are sufficiently impatient, then there is an equilibrium in which buyers offer rL1 at
date 1, and then offer cH at every subsequent date. In this equilibrium, lengthening the horizon increases
surplus when α< 1.
7The (static) surplus maximizing menu contract is {(pHZH) (pLZL)}, where pH = cH , ZH =
(1 − qH)(uL − cL)/[cH − cL − qH(uH − cL)], pL = cL + ZH(cH − cL), and ZL = 1. Here pτ is the money
transfer from seller to buyer and Zτ is the probability that the seller transfers the unit of good to the buyer,
when the seller reports type τ. Even if α = 1, in the DME high quality sellers trade with probability less
than ZH .
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(P4.1) High price offers are made with probabilities ρ˜Ht = 0 for all t < T , and
ρ˜HT =
uL − cL − αφ¯
α(cH − cL) 
(P4.2) Low price offers are made with probabilities
ρ˜L1 =
αφ¯+ cH − u(qH)
α(1− qH)(cH − uL + αφ¯)
and ρ˜LT = 1− ρ˜HT . If T > 2, then ρ˜Lt = 0 for all 1< t < T − 1 and
ρ˜LT−1 =
(1− α)(u(qˆ)− cH)
αqˆ(uH − cH − αφ¯) 
(P4.3) Reservation prices are r˜Lt = uL − αφ¯ for all t < T , and r˜LT = cL.
Moreover, (ρ˜H ρ˜L r˜H r˜L) is a DME of the market when δ= 1. In equilibrium, the payoff
to a buyer is V˜ B1 = αφ¯, and the payoffs to sellers are V˜ H1 = 0 and V˜ L1 = [1 − α(1 − qˆ)] ×
(uL − cL). Thus, the payoff to a buyer (low quality seller) remains above (below) his com-
petitive payoff. The surplus, given by
S˜DME =mL(uL − cL)+mHαφ¯
is independent of T and remains above the competitive surplus. Further, both qualities
are completely illiquid at intermediate dates.
When δ= 1, time can no longer be used as a screening device (until the very last pe-
riod), and the market freezes at all dates but the last two. The DME identified in Propo-
sition 4 is not the unique market equilibrium. For example, there are DME in which
buyers mix over low and negligible prices at dates prior to T in such a way that the total
measure of low quality sellers that trades prior to T is the same as in the DME identified
in Proposition 4; then buyers offer high and low prices at date T with probabilities ρ˜HT
and ρ˜LT , respectively.
We illustrate our findings in Propositions 3 and 4 with an example.
Example 1. Consider a market in which uH = 1, cH = 06, uL = 04, cL = 02, mH = 02,
mL = 08, and T = 10. The graphs in the top row of Figure 1 show the evolution of the
stocks of high quality sellers mHt in the market, and the fraction of high price offers ρ
H
t
for several different combinations of α and δ. The graphs in the middle row show the
evolution of mLt and ρ
L
t . The bottom graph shows the evolution of the fraction of high
quality sellers in the market qHt . ♦
These graphs illustrate several features of equilibrium as frictions become small:
high quality trades more slowly; low quality trades more quickly at the first date and
at the last date, but trades more slowly at intermediate dates; the fraction qHt in-
creases more quickly, but equals qˆ = 05 at the market close regardless of the level of
frictions.
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Figure 1. Equilibrium dynamics in a decentralized market.
Decentralized market equilibria when the horizon is infinite
We now consider decentralized markets that open over an infinite horizon. In these mar-
kets, given a strategy distribution one calculates the maximum expected utility of each
type of trader at each date by solving a dynamic optimization problem. The definition
of DME remains otherwise the same.
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Proposition 5 identifies the limiting DME as T approaches infinity, and establishes
that this limit is a DME of the market that opens over an infinite horizon. In relating the
formulae in Propositions 3 and 5, it is useful to observe that φt approaches zero as T
approaches infinity.
Proposition 5. Assume that δ < 1, and inequalities (F.1) and (F.2) hold (i.e., frictions
are not large). As T approaches infinity the unique DME approaches (ρˆH ρˆL rˆL) given
by the following formulae:
(P5.1) High price offers are made with probabilities ρˆH1 = 0, and for all t > 1,
ρˆHt =
1− δ
αδ
uL − cL
cH − uL 
(P5.2) Low price offers are made with probabilities
ρˆL1 =
q¯− qH
αq¯(1− qH) and ρˆ
L
t = 0 for all t > 1
(P5.3) Reservation prices are rˆLt = uL for all t.
Moreover, if T = ∞, then (ρˆH ρˆL rˆH rˆL) is aDME. In equilibrium, the traders’ payoffs
are the competitive payoffs, i.e., Vˆ B1 = 0, Vˆ H1 = 0, and Vˆ L1 = uL − cL, and the surplus is the
competitive surplus S¯. Further, the liquidities of both qualities at dates t > 1 approach
zero as the traders become perfectly patient.
As the horizon becomes infinite, all units trade eventually. At the first date, some
low quality units trade but no high quality units trade. At subsequent dates, units of
both qualities trade with the same constant probability. In the limit, the traders’ pay-
offs are competitive independently of α and δ, and hence so is the surplus, even if fric-
tions are nonnegligible. Kim (2012) obtains an analogous result in a stationary setting.
In contrast, the previous literature has established that payoffs are competitive only as
frictions vanish, e.g., Gale (1987), Binmore and Herrero (1988), and Moreno and Wood-
ers (2002) for homogenous goods markets, and Moreno and Wooders (2010) for markets
with adverse selection.
The intuition for these results is simple: in the DME of a market that opens over a
finite horizon, the payoff to a buyer at the last date is V BT = αφ¯ > 0, independently of the
horizon T . Since negligible prices are optimal at every date except the last, the payoff to
a buyer is his discounted payoff at the last date, αδT−1φ¯, which approaches zero as the
horizon approaches infinity. Thus, in a market that opens over an infinite horizon the
payoff to a buyer is zero. Hence low price offers, if made with positive probability, must
yield a payoff equal to zero, which implies that rLt = uL > cL. Then high prices must be
offered with positive probability at some dates. At these dates the proportion of high
quality must be q¯ in order for the expected payoff to a buyer offering the high price to be
zero. In a stationary equilibrium, the equation rLt = uL pins down the rate at which high
price offers are made, and qH2 = q¯ pins down the proportion of low price offers at date 1.
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Since the payoffs of buyers is zero, the proportion of high quality sellers in the market
cannot rise above q¯, and thus low price offers are made with probability 0 after date 1.
When T = ∞ there are multiple equilibria. Uniqueness of equilibrium when the
horizon is finite justifies focusing on the limiting DME identified in Proposition 5.8
4. Policy intervention
Our results allow an assessment of the impact of policies aimed at improving market
efficiency, such as subsidies, taxes, or other interventions such as the Public–Private
Investment Program for Legacy Assets or closing the market for some period of time.
Taxes and subsidies conditional on quality
Suppose that the government provides a per unit subsidy of σLB > 0 to buyers of low
quality. Then the instantaneous payoff to a buyer who purchases a unit of low quality at
price p is uL + σLB − p rather than uL − p. The impact of the subsidy may therefore be
evaluated as an increase in the value of low quality. Likewise, if the government provides
a per unit subsidy of σLS > 0 to sellers of low quality, then the instantaneous payoff to a
seller who sells a unit of low quality at price p is p− (cL − σLS ) rather than p− cL, and
therefore the impact of the subsidy may be evaluated as a decrease in the cost of low
quality. Such subsidies are feasible provided that quality is verifiable following purchase.
Taxes are negative subsidies.
When T <∞, the effect of a subsidy may be determined using the formulae given in
Proposition 3. For example, subsidizing buyers of low quality increases the net surplus:
a marginal subsidy increases (gross) surplus by
∂SDME
∂uL
=mL +mHαδT−1 dφ¯
duL
=mL +mHαδT−1(1− qˆ)
whereas the present value of the subsidy is at most mL since at most mL units receive
the subsidy. Subsidizing sellers of low quality increases the net surplus as well since
∂SDME
∂cL
= −mL +mHαδT−1 dφ¯
dcL
= −mL −mHαδT−1(1− qˆ)u
H − uL
uH − cL <−m
L
Comparing these two expressions reveals that subsidizing buyers has a larger effect on
surplus, i.e., ∂SDME/∂uL > |∂SDME/∂cL|, since (uH − uL)/(uH − cL) < 1. Corollary 1 be-
low summarizes the effect of subsidies to low quality on payoffs and surplus. Its proof,
which follows from differentiating the formulae given in Proposition 3, is omitted.
8When T = ∞ there is a continuum of DME that share the basic properties identified in Proposition 5:
ρH1 = 0, ρL1 > 0 is such that qH2 = q¯, and rL1 = uL ≤ rLt for all t > 1. In these DME, payoffs are competitive:
V B1 = 0 implies rL1 = uL, and thus V L1 = δV L2 = rL1 − cL = uL − cL. In fact, we conjecture that payoffs are
competitive in all DME. This conjecture is based on the idea that in all DME buyers make negligible price
offers with positive probability at every date, which implies that their payoff would diverge if it was positive.
Proving this conjecture requires establishing versions of Lemmas 1 and 2 when T = ∞. (The proofs of these
lemmas for T <∞ involve backward induction arguments that break down when T = ∞.)
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Corollary 1. Under the assumptions of Proposition 3, a subsidy to either buyers or sell-
ers of low quality increases the payoffs of buyers and low quality sellers, the net surplus,
and the liquidity of high quality. However, subsidizing buyers has a larger effect on the
payoff of buyers and on the surplus SDME, and a smaller effect on the payoff of low quality
sellers, than subsidizing sellers.
The intuition for the result that subsidies to low quality raise surplus is as follows:
A subsidy, whether to buyers or sellers, raises the payoff to buyers at the last date, and
therefore raises their payoff at every date. Consider a subsidy to buyers. Buyers must
remain indifferent between low and negligible price offers (i.e., uL − rLt = δV Bt+1) prior
to date T . The value of low quality increases by the subsidy, whereas δV Bt+1 increases
by less. Thus, the reservation price of low quality sellers, and hence their payoff, must
increase. This requires that high price offers be made more frequently, which increases
the liquidity of high quality and the surplus. A subsidy to buyers yields a greater increase
in the payoff to buyers at the last date, and therefore leads to a greater increase in surplus
than does an equal-sized subsidy to sellers.
Next we describe the impact of subsidies to buyers and sellers of high quality. When
T <∞, the effect of such subsidies may be assessed using the formulae of Proposition 3
as changes in the value or cost of high quality. Their impact on the net surplus is un-
clear in general as it is difficult to calculate the present value of the subsidy, but as δ
approaches 1 the effect is clear from Proposition 4: A subsidy to buyers of high quality
affects surplus through its impact on qˆ:
∂S˜DME
∂uH
= −mHα(uL − cL) ∂qˆ
∂uH
=mHα(uL − cL) c
H − cL
(uH − cL)2 
Since high quality trades only at the last date, the marginal cost of the subsidy ap-
proaches mHαρ˜HT . Thus the marginal effect on the net surplus approaches
∂S˜DME
∂uH
−mHαρ˜HT = mHα(uL − cL)
cH − cL
(uH − cL)2 −m
H u
L − cL − αφ¯
(cH − cL)
≤ mH u
L − cL
uH − cL
(
cH − cL
uH − cL − 1
)
< 0
where the weak inequality holds since α ≤ 1. A subsidy to sellers of high quality also
reduces the net surplus since
∂S˜DME
∂cH
= −mHα(uL − cL) ∂qˆ
∂cH
= −mHα u
L − cL
uH − cL 
and therefore ∣∣∣∣∂S˜DME∂cH
∣∣∣∣−mHαρ˜HT = −(1− α)mH uL − cLuH − cL u
H − cL
cH − cL ≤ 0
We state these results in Corollary 2.
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Corollary 2. Under the assumptions of Proposition 3, subsidizing buyers or sellers of
high quality increases the payoff of buyers and the surplus, and decreases the payoff of
low quality sellers, although subsidizing sellers has larger effects. Moreover, the liquidity
of high quality increases (decreases) if sellers (buyers) are subsidized. As δ approaches 1,
either subsidy reduces the net surplus.
A subsidy to buyers of high quality raises the payoffs of buyers at every date. Since
buyers make low price offers at every date, the reservation price of low quality sellers,
and therefore their payoff, must decrease. Hence high price offers are made less fre-
quently, i.e., the liquidity of high quality decreases. A subsidy to sellers of high quality
also raises the payoff of buyers at every date, but it has a direct negative effect on the
reservation price (and payoff) of low quality sellers, since the high price offer decreases
by an amount equal to the subsidy. High price offers must be made more frequently so
as to maintain the buyers’ indifference between high and low price offers at every date.
Table 1 illustrates the effect of several policies for the market described in Example 1
when α = δ = 095. The second row describes the effect of a subsidy to buyers of low
quality, σLB = 005. Relative to the equilibrium without any subsidy or tax (first row), the
volume of high quality sellers that trades increases 1105 percentage points, and the net
surplus increases 4% from 01720 to 01790. The third row shows the effect of a subsidy
to sellers of low quality. The differential effects of these two subsidies are consistent with
Corollary 1.
The fourth and fifth rows of Table 1 describe the effects of subsidies to buyers and
sellers of high quality, respectively. Both subsidies decrease the payoff of low quality
sellers and increase the payoff of buyers and the (gross) surplus. Consistent with Corol-
lary 2, these effects are stronger for the subsidy to sellers than the subsidy to buyers. In
the example, the negative effect on net surplus of the subsidy to sellers is smaller.
The sixth row of Table 1 reports the effects of an unconditional subsidy to buyers. (If
quality is not verifiable after purchase, then a subsidy conditional on the quality of the
good is not feasible.) The unconditional subsidy has a smaller positive effect on the net
surplus than a subsidy to buyers of low quality alone. The seventh row of Table 1 shows
the effects of taxing buyers of high quality, which are opposite to those of a subsidy. In
particular, the measures of trade of both qualities and the net surplus increase.
Next we address the effects of taxes and subsidies in a market that opens over an
infinite horizon. In such markets the effects of subsidies on either quality are easily
assessed by differentiating the formulae provided in Proposition 5. Since low prices are
offered only at the first date, the liquidity of both qualities at each date t > 1 is αρˆHt . Note
that αρˆHt is independent of α, i.e., the liquidities of both goods are unaffected by changes
in the probability of meeting a partner. Inspecting these formulae leads to an interesting
first observation: in these markets subsidizing either buyers or sellers of τ-quality has
identical effects on payoffs and surplus. Corollary 3 describes the effects of subsidizing
low quality. The last statement in the corollary, that as traders become perfectly patient
the subsidy amounts to a transfer to low quality sellers, is established in the Appendix.
Corollary 3. Assume that T = ∞ and the assumptions of Proposition 5 hold. Subsidiz-
ing low quality has no effect on the payoff of buyers, while it increases the payoff of low
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Vol. trade % Payoffs Surplus
Policy (σ = 005) H L mBV B1 mLV L1 SDME Net Policy cost
None 4790 9909 00599 01121 01720 01720 00000
Sub. buyer τ =L 5895 9920 00748 01401 02150 01790 00360
Sub. seller τ =L 5430 9924 00704 01436 02140 01777 00363
Sub. buyer τ =H 4660 9896 00634 01093 01727 01693 00034
Sub. seller τ =H 5120 9888 00673 01061 01735 01697 00038
Sub. buyer τ ∈ {HL} 5740 9909 00792 01366 02159 01761 00398
Tax buyer τ =H 4940 9920 00559 01153 01712 01748 −00036
PPIP 4645 9895 00639 01089 01728 01681 00047
Sub. low price 6050 9930 00704 01796 02141 01821 00320
Sub. high price 4517 9881 00673 01061 01735 01702 00033
Table 1. Policy effects.
quality sellers, the net surplus, and the liquidities of both qualities at dates t > 1. As δ
approaches 1, the subsidy has no effect on the net surplus and amounts to a transfer to
low quality sellers.
Interestingly, a tax on high quality raises revenue without affecting either payoffs or
surplus, thereby increasing net surplus. A tax on buyers of high quality, for example,
increases ρˆL1 while leaving ρˆ
L
t and ρˆ
H
t unchanged for t > 1, thus accelerating trade at
date 1 and leaving unaffected the liquidities of both qualities at t > 1. We state this result
in Corollary 4.
Corollary 4. Assume that T = ∞ and the assumptions of Proposition 5 hold. A tax on
high quality raises revenuewithout affecting payoffs or surplus, thereby increasing the net
surplus.
The public–private investment program for legacy assets
This program was designed to draw new private capital into the market for troubled real
estate-related assets, comprised of legacy loans and securities, by providing equity co-
investment and public financing. Its main objective was to reduce the perceived exces-
sive liquidity discounts in legacy asset prices. The program provided private investors
with nonrecourse loans to purchase legacy assets. Investors had to provide only a small
amount of equity (a fraction γ = 114 of the purchase price). An investor who purchased
a low quality asset could choose to default on the loan and surrender the asset, losing
only her equity (i.e., the fraction γ of the price paid for the asset).9
This policy may be framed in our setting as a subsidy to buyers who pay the high
price cH for a low quality unit: under this program a buyer who purchases at the high
9The U.S. Treasury website (http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/
credit-market-programs/ppip) provides abundant documentation about this program. See the White Pa-
per released on March 23, 2009, which is reproduced in the Supplement.
Theoretical Economics 11 (2016) Dynamic markets for lemons 621
price, upon observing the quality of the unit acquired faces the choice to keep the unit
and pay the loan, which is optimal if it is of high quality since
uH > (1− γ)cH
or default and surrender the unit, which is optimal when it is of low quality provided
uL < (1− γ)cH
Assume that γ is sufficiently small that this inequality holds. Then the payoff to a buyer
offering the high price cH , denoted by PH , which is a function of the fraction of high
quality in the market is q and the effective subsidy s := (1− γ)cH − uL, is given by
PH(q s) = q(uH − cH)+ (1− q)(−γcH)
= u(q)− cH + (1− q)s
Of course, the lemons problem can be solved altogether by setting a subsidy suffi-
ciently large. Evaluating the impact of a small subsidy is somewhat more complex than
a comparative statics exercise. However, the introduction of a small PPIP subsidy does
not change the basic properties of equilibrium, and the formulae provided in Proposi-
tions 3–5 describing the DME can be readily modified to show the impact of this policy.
Reviewing the proof of Proposition 3 reveals how the introduction of a subsidy s af-
fects the DME: The probabilities of high price offers and reservation prices of low quality
sellers, as well as the traders’ payoffs and surplus, are not affected directly by the sub-
sidy, but only indirectly via its impact on the fraction qˆ(s) of high quality sellers in the
market at the last date. Of course, qˆ(s) affects in turn the entire sequence qHt and the
functions φt(s) = αδT−t φ¯(s), where φ¯(s) = (1 − qˆ(s))(uL − cL). However, the subsidy
appears explicitly in the formulae describing the sequence of probabilities of low price
offers; we provide these formulae in the Supplement.
Intuitively, the impact of this policy is as follows: In equilibrium, at date T buyers are
indifferent between offering the high or the low price, and therefore the fraction of high
quality sellers qHT must be such that
PH(qHT  s)= (1− qHT )(uL − cL)
The solution to this equation, qHT = qˆ(s), is decreasing in s. Hence introducing a PPIP
subsidy s decreases the fraction of high quality in the market, and increases the buyers’
payoff, at the last date.
It is easy to see the effects of a PPIP subsidy in a market that opens only for two
dates: the measure of low quality sellers that trades at date 1 decreases. Moreover, since
buyers are indifferent between trading at date 1 or at date 2, and their expected utility is
greater with the subsidy, the reservation price of low quality sellers at date 1 decreases
with the subsidy, which in turn implies that the probability of a high price offer at date
2 decreases, and the measure of high quality sellers that trades decreases as well. Thus,
this policy reduces the net surplus and makes both qualities less liquid.
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The analysis of the impact of a PPIP subsidy for a market that opens for more than
two dates is more complex. However, its qualitative effects, as well as the intuition for
how it affects the DME, are analogous to a subsidy to buyers of high quality (see Corol-
laries 2 and 5). We summarize our conclusions in Corollary 5.
Corollary 5. Under the assumptions of Proposition 3, a PPIP subsidy increases the pay-
off of buyers, and decreases the payoff of low quality sellers and the liquidity of high qual-
ity. Moreover, it reduces the net surplus as δ approaches 1.
For the market in Example 1, the row in Table 1 labeled PPIP shows the impact of this
program: Its effects are qualitatively the same as a subsidy to buyers of high quality (see
the fourth row), but the PPIP program leads to a larger reduction of the net surplus due
to its larger cost.
In a market that opens over an infinite horizon, the only impact of a PPIP program
is to decrease the probability of low price offers at the first date. Since surplus is un-
affected, it is purely wasteful: it causes an increase of the cost of delay in trading low
quality that exactly offsets the subsidy.
Camargo and Lester (2014) study the impact of the PPIP program on liquidity as
measured by the minimum time (taken over the set of all market equilibria) required
for all units of both qualities to trade. They show that if the initial fraction of high qual-
ity sellers is high, then the introduction of a sufficiently large PPIP subsidy gives rise to
equilibria where all units trade earlier, thus increasing liquidity. (In contrast, our analysis
focuses on marginal subsidies, which do not change the basic structure of equilibrium.
A sufficiently large PPIP subsidy eliminates the lemons problem entirely and hence in-
creases liquidity in our setting as well.) Their results are obtained assuming that buyers
may offer one of two exogenously given prices.
Camargo and Lester (2014) also provide numerical examples showing that when
price offers are unrestricted a PPIP subsidy has ambiguous effects on liquidity: it may
decrease it when the lemons problem is severe, and increase it when it is not severe. In
contrast, our Corollary 5 shows that a PPIP subsidy unambiguously reduces the liquidity
of high quality. Our results, however, are obtained under the assumption that frictions
are not large, whereas Camargo and Lester (2014) assume that frictions are significant.
In our setting, when frictions are large one can construct equilibria in which all buyers
offer the low price for dates t ≤ tˆ, and then offer the high price for t > tˆ. A PPIP subsidy
may lead buyers to offer the high price earlier, i.e., increase the liquidity of high qual-
ity at date tˆ. Thus, the difference between our results and those of Camargo and Lester
(2014) arises as a consequence of our focus on marginal subsidies and small frictions.
Taxes and subsidies conditional on price
Subsidies conditional on the quality of the good are feasible only if quality is verifiable
following purchase. Hence it is useful to study the effects of taxes and subsidies con-
ditional on the price at which the good trades. The effect of a small subsidy may also
be assessed by modifying the formulae provided in Propositions 3–5. It is interesting to
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observe that unlike subsidies conditional on the quality of the good, the effects of a sub-
sidy conditional on the price at which the good trades are the same whether it is given
to buyers or sellers.
Subsidies conditional on trading either at the high price cH or at a low price (i.e.,
a price below cH ), affect the fraction of high quality sellers in the market at the last date,
which becomes a function of the subsidy, as well as the functions φ¯ and φt involved in
the formulae describing the DME. The formulae describing the probabilities of high and
low price offers must be modified appropriately; see the Supplement. These formulae
reveal the effects of these subsidies on traders’ payoffs, surplus, and market liquidity.
A subsidy conditional on trading at a low price, for example, increases the payoff
to offering the low price at the last date, and therefore it increases the fraction of high
quality in the market needed to preserve the indifference between high and low price of-
fers. This has an impact on the probabilities of offering high, low, and negligible prices,
as well as on the reservation prices of low quality sellers, at every date. Corollary 6 de-
scribes the impact of such a subsidy. The intuition for these results is analogous to that
of a subsidy to low quality; see Corollary 1.
Corollary 6. Under the assumptions of Proposition 3, a subsidy conditional on trading
at a low price increases the payoffs of buyers and low quality sellers, as well as the net sur-
plus. The liquidity of low (high) quality at date 1 (T ) increases. When T = ∞ the subsidy
increases the liquidity of both qualities after the first date, as well as the net surplus.
The next to the last row of Table 1 describes the effects of a subsidy conditional on
trading at a low price for the market described in Example 1. This policy is the most
effective: relative to the DME without intervention (first row), the volume of trade of high
quality increases 126 percentage points, and the net surplus increases by 59% from
01720 to 01821. Low quality sellers are the main beneficiaries as their payoff increases
by 60%, while the payoff of buyers increases by 175%.
The effects of a subsidy conditional on trading at the high price on payoffs, surplus,
and liquidity are summarized in Corollary 7. This subsidy has effects analogous to those
of subsidies to buyers or sellers of high quality: compare the fourth and fifth rows to the
last row in Table 1.
Corollary 7. Under the assumptions of Proposition 3, a subsidy conditional on trading
at the high price increases (decreases) the payoffs of buyers (low quality sellers). The liq-
uidity of high quality decreases. When T = ∞ the subsidy is purely wasteful, whereas a
tax raises revenue without affecting payoffs, thereby increasing the net surplus.
Restricting trading opportunities
Our results allow assessing other policies studied in the literature such as closing the
market for some period of time: Since by Proposition 3 surplus is decreasing in T , closing
the market altogether after date 2 increases the surplus. Intuitively, a longer horizon
makes it more difficult to screen low quality sellers.
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Closing the market at intermediate dates has no effect when traders are patient and
the horizon is short. Suppose, for example, that the market is closed at all interme-
diate dates t ∈ {2    T − 1}. If inequalities (F.1) and (F.2) hold when δ is replaced by
δT−1, then the formulae of Proposition 3, particularized for T = 2 and a discount factor
equal to δT−1, describe the market outcome. An inspection of these formulae reveals
that this intervention does not affect payoffs and surplus. The intuition for this result is
as follows: Since buyers make negligible offers at every date except the last, their payoff
is their discounted utility at the last date, i.e., αδT−1(1 − qˆ)(uL − cL), and is the same
whether the market is open at intermediate dates or not. Furthermore, since in both
markets buyers obtain the same payoff and are indifferent between low and negligible
price offers at date 1, this implies that low quality sellers have the same reservation price
at date 1, and thus the same payoff in both markets.
When the time horizon is long, however, closing the market at intermediate dates
may increase surplus. For simplicity, assume that α = 1 and let T > tˆ, where tˆ is suffi-
ciently large that
uL − cL ≥ δtˆ−1(uH − cL)
(Hence (F.1) fails if δ is replaced by δT−1.) If the market opens at date 1, closes at dates
t ∈ {2     tˆ − 1}, and reopens at dates t ∈ {tˆ    T }, there is an equilibrium in which all
buyers offer rL1 = δtˆ−1(cH − cL)+ cL at date 1, and offer cH at every date t ∈ {tˆ     T }. It
easy to verify that the surplus realized in this equilibrium,
mL(uL − cL)+mHδtˆ−1(uH − cH)
is greater than the surplus in the DME when the market is always open, whether T <∞
or T = ∞. Thus, for markets in which T is large or infinite, closing the market after
the first date for sufficiently long that the (separating) equilibrium described above can
be sustained, raises welfare; closing the market prevents the wasteful delay that results
when low quality sellers attempt to pool with high quality sellers.
We summarize these results in Corollary 8.
Corollary 8. Under the assumptions of Proposition 3, if (F.1) and (F.2) hold when δ is
replaced by δT−1, then closing the market for dates 2    T − 1 has no effect on payoffs
or surplus. If α is near 1 and uL − cL > δT−1(uH − cL), then closing the market for some
period of time may increase the surplus.
Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2013) obtain related results for continuous-time dynamic
competitive equilibrium with adverse selection and a continuum of qualities. In con-
trast to the first part of Corollary 8, they provide an example of a market that opens over
a finite horizon T , in which total surplus is higher when trade is “infrequent” (i.e., re-
stricted to just two instants, date 0 and date T ) rather than taking place continuously
over [0T ]. Further, they show that it is never optimal for the market to be open contin-
uously on [0T ] and give conditions under which infrequent trade is optimal. In their
model, sellers’ types are publicly revealed at date T , at which time there is no adverse
selection, which drives the differences in results. In a market that opens over an infinite
horizon, in both models closing the market for some time increases the surplus.
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Government purchases
We discuss the impact of government purchases. Assume that at the market open the
government offers to buy β units of the good, e.g., via a uniform price auction. In equi-
librium, the government acquires β units of low quality at a price equal to the reserva-
tion price of low quality sellers in the market that follows, i.e., rL1 . Our assumption that
the matching probability is constant over time, and equal for buyers and sellers, is no
longer appropriate since after the government intervention there are more buyers than
sellers in the market. Let us assume instead that the buyers’ matching probability is a
function of the market tightness, i.e., the ratio θt = (mHt + mLt )/mBt . Since equal mea-
sures of buyers and sellers trade and leave the market every date, θt decreases over time.
Hence a direct effect of this program is to decrease the buyers’ matching probability at
every date.
Assuming that β is not so large as to alter the structure of the DME, the buyers’ pay-
off at the last date conditional on being matched is unaffected since buyers must re-
main indifferent between offering the high and the low price. However, since the buy-
ers’ matching probability is smaller, then their payoff at the last date decreases. Further,
since buyers must be willing to offer high, low, and negligible prices at every date but the
first and last, and their expected utility at the last date is smaller, then to reduce the pay-
off of low (high) price offers in line to the decrease in the payoff of negligible price offers,
the reservation price of low quality sellers increases (the fraction of high quality sellers
in the market decreases), i.e., the payoff of low quality sellers increases, which implies
that high price offers are made more frequently. Thus, a positive impact of the program
is to increase the volume of trade of high quality. If government purchases crowd out
private trade and the government’s value for low quality is less than the buyers’ value,
then the program also has a negative effect on surplus, and the overall effect is unclear.
We examine the impact of this policy in a market that operates over two dates, and
in which at every date t buyers are matched with probability αθt . In this market, since
the fraction of high quality in the market at date 2 is the same with and without the
government purchases, the measure of low quality sellers who sell their good at date 1
(either to the government or to private buyers) is also the same; and since all matched
low quality sellers trade at date 2, the liquidity of low quality, and hence the volume of
trade of low quality, are unaffected. Since the buyers’ payoff at date 2 is smaller, for buy-
ers to be willing to offer negligible prices at date 1 the payoff to offering the low price
must decrease, which implies that the reservation price of low quality sellers increases,
and therefore that the high price is offered with a greater probability at date 2. Hence
the volume of trade of high quality increases. The effect on the net surplus depends on
whether the surplus gained from the increase in the volume of trade of high quality is
greater or less than the surplus loss due to the smaller value of low quality to the govern-
ment. We summarize these conclusions in Corollary 9. The formal analysis is presented
in the Supplement.
Corollary 9. If T = 2 and the assumptions of Proposition 3 hold, then government pur-
chases at themarket open increase the payoff of lowquality sellers and the liquidity of high
quality, and decrease the payoff of buyers. If the value of low quality to the government is
close to the buyers’ value, then the net surplus increases.
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Tirole (2012) studies the design of government policies aimed at rejuvenating a mar-
ket for a legacy asset frozen due to adverse selection. In a market with a continuum
of qualities, he proposes a mechanism that, operating in conjunction with the private
market, allows the government to cleanse the market of lower quality assets, thus liq-
uidifying the private market. Our starting point in not a frozen market, but one in which
the volume and timing of trade are suboptimal, and the intervention involves the gov-
ernment participating in the private market, buying low quality assets at the first date,
and letting the market freely operate afterward. As in Tirole (2012), this intervention
increases liquidity and surplus, but unlike Tirole (2012) it is profitable when the govern-
ment values the asset the same as buyers.
Philippon and Skreta (2012) study optimal government interventions in lending
markets when every firm has a positive net present value (NPV) investment opportunity
but requires outside funding to finance it. Firms are privately informed about the qual-
ity of their legacy assets, and adverse selection may lead to inefficiently low investment
levels. They show that to implement any target investment level, the cost minimizing
intervention involves the government offering debt contracts. In their setting, an inter-
vention that increases investment also increases surplus. In our setting, however, an
intervention affects surplus via its impact on the measures of high and low quality units
that trade, and also through its impact on the timing of trade, and may reduce surplus.
5. Dynamic competitive equilibrium
When the horizon is finite and frictions are not large, in the equilibrium of a decen-
tralized market most low quality units as well as some high quality units trade, and the
surplus is above the competitive surplus. When the horizon is infinite all units of both
qualities trade, although with delay, and payoffs and surplus are competitive.
We study in the Supplement the market described in Section 2 but where trade is
centralized, i.e., trade is multilateral and agents are price takers. We show in Proposi-
tion 6 that if the horizon is finite and traders are patient, then in a dynamic competitive
equilibrium (DCE) all low quality units trade at the first date and no high quality units
ever trade. Hence the surplus realized is the same as in the static competitive equilib-
rium. We show that subsidies, which are effective in decentralized markets, are inef-
fective in centralized markets. Moreover, high (low) quality is more (less) liquid in de-
centralized markets than in centralized ones. These features hold even as frictions van-
ish. These results suggest that when the horizon is finite, decentralized markets perform
better than centralized markets.
We also show that if traders are sufficiently impatient or the horizon is infinite, there
are dynamic competitive equilibria in which all low quality units trade immediately at
a low price and all high quality units trade with delay at a high price. These separating
DCE, in which different qualities trade at different dates, yield a surplus greater than
the static competitive surplus. Consequently, when the horizon is infinite, centralized
markets may perform better than decentralized markets.
Interestingly, we show in Proposition 7 that as frictions vanish the surplus at a sep-
arating DCE of a market that opens over an infinite horizon equals the surplus in the
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equilibrium of a decentralized market that opens over a finite horizon. Intuitively this
result holds since the same incentive constraints operate in both markets. In a separat-
ing DCE high quality trades with sufficiently long delay that low quality sellers are willing
to trade immediately at a low price rather than waiting to trade at a high price. Likewise,
in a DME high price offers are made with a sufficiently small probability that low quality
sellers are willing to immediately accept a low price, rather than waiting for a high price.
Appendix: Proofs
We begin by establishing a number of lemmas. In the proofs, we refer to previous results
established in lemmas or propositions by using the letters “L” and “P,” respectively, fol-
lowed by the number. The proof of Lemma 1, which is straightforward, is provided in
the Supplement.
Lemma 1. Assume that 1< T <∞ and δ < 1, and let (λ rH rL) be a DME. Then for each
t ∈ {1    T },
(L1.1) λt(max{rHt  rLt })= 1,
(L1.2) rHt = cH > rLt , V Ht = 0< V Bt , and V Lt ≤ cH − cL,
(L1.3) qHt+1 ≥ qHt ,
(L1.4) λt(cH)= 1,
(L1.5) λt(p)= λt(rLt ) for all p ∈ [rLt  cH).
With these results in hand we prove Propositions 1 and 2.
Proof of Proposition 1. Part P1.1 follows from L1.2 and L1.3, and P1.2 follows from
L1.4 and L1.5. 
Proof of Proposition 2. We prove P2.3. Suppose by way of contradiction that
ρHT + ρLT < 1. Then negligible prices are optimal, and therefore V BT = δV BT+1 = 0, which
contradicts L1.2.
We prove P2.1. Suppose contrary to P2.1 that there is k such that ρHk + ρLk = 0. By
P2.3, k < T . Let k be the largest such date. Then ρHk+1 + ρLk+1 > 0 and qτk+1 = qτk for
τ ∈ {HL}. If ρHk+1 > 0, i.e., offering rHk+1 is optimal, then
V Bk+1 = α(qHk+1uH + qLk+1uL − cH)+ (1− α)δV Bk+2
Since V Bk+1 ≥ δV Bk+2 (because the payoff to offering a negligible price is δV Bk+2), then
qHk+1u
H + qLk+1uL − cH ≥ V Bk+1
And since qτk+1 = qτk for τ ∈ {HL}, V Bk+1 > 0 (by L1.2), and δ < 1, then
qHk u
H + qLkuL − cH = qHk+1uH + qLk+1uL − cH ≥ V Bk+1 > δV Bk+1
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Therefore a negligible price offer at k is not optimal, which contradicts that ρHk +ρLk = 0.
Hence ρHk+1 = 0, and thus ρLk+1 > 0 and
V Lk+1 = αρLk+1(rLk+1 − cL)+ (1− αρLk+1)δV Lk+2 = δV Lk+2
Therefore,
rLk = cL + δV Lk+1 ≤ cL + V Lk+1 = cL + δV Lk+2 = rLk+1
Since ρLk+1 > 0, i.e., price offers of r
L
k+1 are optimal at date k+ 1, we have
qLk+1(u
L − rLk+1)+ (1− qLk+1)δV Bk+2 ≥ δV Bk+2
Hence
δV Bk+2 ≤ uL − rLk+1
and
V Bk+1 = αqLk+1(uL − rLk+1)+ (1− αqLk+1)δV Bk+2 ≤ uL − rLk+1
Since ρHk + ρLk = 0, then the payoff to a negligible offer at date kis greater than or equal
to the payoff to a low price offer at date k, i.e.,
δV Bk+1 ≥ αqLk (uL − rLk )+ (1− αqLk )δV Bk+1
Thus uL − rLk ≤ δV Bk+1. Since V Bk+1 > 0 (by L1.2) and δ < 1, then
uL − rLk ≤ δV Bk+1 < V Bk+1 ≤ uL − rLk+1
i.e., rLk+1 < r
L
k , which is a contradiction. Hence ρ
H
k + ρLk > 0 for all k, which establishes
P2.1.
We prove P2.2. Since qH1 = qH < q¯ by assumption and V B2 > 0 by L1.2, then
qH1 u
H + qL1 uL − cH < 0< δV B2 
Hence offering cH at date 1 is not optimal; i.e., ρH1 = 0. Therefore ρL1 > 0 by P2.1. 
Lemma 2 establishes properties that a DME has when frictions are not large. Recall
that by assumption qH < q¯ < qˆ < 1. When ρHt + ρLt = 1 at some date t, then the fraction
of high quality sellers in the market at date t + 1 is
qHt+1 =
mHt+1
mHt+1 + (1− α)mLt+1
= (1− αρ
H
t )q
H
t
(1− αρHt )qHt + (1− α)(1− qHt )
= g(qHt ρHt )
where the function g, given by
g(x y) := (1− αy)x
(1− αy)x+ (1− α)(1− x)
is increasing in x and decreasing in y, and satisfies g(qH ρ¯/(αδ)) > qˆ by (F.2).
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Lemma 2. Assume that 1< T <∞, δ < 1, and the inequalities (F.1) and (F.2) are satisfied
(i.e., frictions are not large), and let (ρHρL rH rL) be a DME. Then for all t ∈ {1    T },
(L2.1) ρHt < 1,
(L2.2) ρLt < 1,
(L2.3) ρHT > 0, ρ
L
T > 0, and q
H
T = qˆ,
(L2.4) V Lt > 0,
(L2.5) ρLt > 0,
(L2.6) ρHt < ρ¯/(αδ),
(L2.7) if t < T , then ρLt + ρHt < 1 and ρHt+1 > 0.
The proof of Lemma 2 is provided in the Supplement. Now we prove Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 3. We show first that if (ρHρL rH rL) is a DME, then it is given
by P3.1 to P3.4, and the payoffs and surplus are as given in Proposition 3.
Since qHT = qˆ by L2.3, then a buyer’s expected utility at T is
V BT = α(1− qˆ)(uL − cL)=φT 
By L2.7 negligible offers are optimal for all t < T , i.e., 1− ρHt − ρLt > 0. Then V Bt = δV Bt+1
for t < T by (DME.B), and therefore for all t we have
V Bt =φt (1)
By L1.2,
rHt = cH (2)
for all t. Since ρHt > 0, and 1− ρHt − ρLt > 0 for 1< t < T by L2.7, and δφt+1 =φt then
qHt u
H + (1− qHt )uL − cH = δV Bt+1 =φt
by (DME.B). Hence for 1< t < T we have
qHt =
cH − uL +φt
uH − uL  (3)
Since ρLt > 0 by L2.5 and 1− ρHt − ρLt > 0 for t < T by L2.7, then by (DME.B),
αqLt (u
L − rLt )+ (1− αqLt )δV Bt+1 = δV Bt+1
i.e.,
uL − rLt = δV Bt+1 =φt
Hence for t < T we have
rLt = uL −φt (4)
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Moreover, since rLT − cL = δV LT+1 by (DMEL), then
rLT = cL (5)
We calculate the expected utility of low quality sellers. Since rLt − cL = δV Lt+1 for all t
by (DMEL), then (4) yields
uL −φt − cL = δV Lt+1
for t < T . Re-indexing we get
V Lt =
1
δ
(uL − cL −φt−1)= u
L − cL
δ
−φt (6)
for t ∈ {2    T }. And since ρH1 = 0 by P2.2, then
V L1 = δV L2 = uL − cL − δφ2 = uL − cL −φ1 (7)
Next we calculate the probabilities of high price offers ρH . Since rLt − cL = δV Lt+1 for
all t by (DMEL), we can write the expected utility of a low quality seller as
V Lt = αρHt (cH − cL)+ (1− αρHt )δV Lt+1
i.e.,
V Lt − δV Lt+1 = αρHt (cH − cL − δV Lt+1)
For 1< t < T , since δφt+1 =φt , then δV Lt+1 = uL − cL −φt by (6), and therefore
V Lt − δV Lt+1 =
1− δ
δ
(uL − cL)
Hence
1− δ
δ
(uL − cL)= αρHt (cH − cL − (uL − cL −φt))
and solving for ρHt yields
ρHt =
1− δ
αδ
uL − cL
cH − uL +φt (8)
for 1< t < T . Clearly ρHt > 0. Moreover, since
αδ(cH − uL +φt) > αδ(cH − uL)
(by (F.1)) > (1+ δα)(1− δ)ρ¯(cH − cL)
= (1+ δα)(1− δ)(uL − cL)
> (1− δ)(uL − cL)
then ρHt < 1.
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Recall that ρH1 = 0 by P2.2. We calculate ρHT . Since rT = cL by (DMEL), then
V LT = αρHT (cH − cL)
Hence using (6) for t = T we have
uL − cL
δ
−φT = αρHT (cH − cL)
Solving for ρHT and using δφT =φT−1 = αδ(1− qˆ)(uL − cL) yields
ρHT =
uL − cL −φT−1
αδ(cH − cL)
= (1− αδ(1− qˆ)) 1
αδ
uL − cL
cH − cL (9)
= (1− αδ(1− qˆ)) ρ¯
αδ

Substituting φT−1 = αδ(1− qˆ)(uL − cL) in this expression we get
ρHT = (1− αδ(1− qˆ))
1
αδ
uL − cL
cH − cL = (1− αδ(1− qˆ))
ρ¯
αδ

and therefore ρHT > 0. Moreover, since ρ¯/(αδ) < 1 by (F.1), then ρ
H
T < 1.
We calculate the probabilities of low prices offers ρL. For each t we have
qHt+1 =
(1− αρHt )qHt
(1− αρHt )qHt + (1− α(ρLt + ρHt ))qLt

Solving for ρLt we obtain
ρLt = (1− αρHt )
qHt+1 − qHt
αqHt+1(1− qHt )
for all t. Since qHt+1 ≥ qHt by L1.3 and ρHt < 1, then ρLt ≥ 0. For t = 1 we have ρH1 = 0 by
P2.2, and therefore
ρL1 =
φ2 − (u(qH)− cH)
α(1− qH)(cH − uL +φ2) > 0 (10)
where the inequality follows since u(qH)− cH < 0.
Since ρHT + ρLT = 1 by P2.3, then
ρLT = 1− ρHT = 1−
uL − cL −φT−1
αδ(cH − cL)  (11)
Since ρHT < 1 as shown above, we have ρ
L
T > 0.
632 Moreno and Wooders Theoretical Economics 11 (2016)
If T > 2, then for t ∈ {2    T − 2}, using (3) yields
ρLt = (1− αρHt )
(1− δ)φt+1
α(cH − uL +φt+1)
uH − uL
uH − cH −φt > 0 (12)
Also qHT = qˆ and (3) yield
ρLT−1 = (1− αρHT−1)
u(qˆ)− cH −φT−1
αqˆ(uH − cH −φT−1) 
Since
(1− qˆ)(uL − cL)= u(qˆ)− cH
then
uH − cH −φT−1 = uH − cH − αδ(1− qˆ)(uL − cL)
= uH − cH − αδ(u(qˆ)− cH)
> uH − cH − αδ(uH − cH)
= (1− αδ)(uH − cH)
> 0
and
u(qˆ)− cH −φT−1 = u(qˆ)− cH − αδ(1− qˆ)(uL − cL)= (1− αδ)(u(qˆ)− cH) > 0
Hence
ρLT−1 = (1− αρHT−1)(1− αδ)
u(qˆ)− cH
αqˆ(uH − cH −φT−1) > 0
We show that ρHt + ρLt < 1 for t < T . We first show ρH1 + ρL1 < 1. Since g(x y) is
decreasing in y, qH1 = qH , and g(qH ρ¯/(αδ)) > qˆ (by (F.2)), then
g(qH1 0)=
qH1
qH1 + (1− α)(1− qH1 )
> g(qH ρ¯/(αδ)) > qˆ
Hence αqˆ(1 − qH1 ) > qˆ − qH1 . Then ρH1 = 0 by P2.2, (x − qH1 )/[αx(1 − qH1 )] is increasing
in x, and qH2 ≤ qHT = qˆ by L2.3 and L1.3, imply
ρH1 + ρL1 =
qH2 − qH1
αqH2 (1− qH1 )
<
qˆ− qH1
αqˆ(1− qH1 )
< 1
For t ∈ {2    T − 2}, from (8) we have
ρHt <
1− δ
αδ
uL − cL
cH − uL  (13)
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Also using (3), for 1< t < T − 1 we have
qHt+1 − qHt
αqHt+1(1− qHt )
= (1− δ) φt+1
α(cH − uL +φt+1)
uH − uL
uH − cH −φt 
Since φt < α(1− qˆ)(uL − cL) for all t, and the ratio φt+1/(cH − uL +φt+1) is increasing
in φt+1, we have
qHt+1 − qHt
αqHt+1(1− qHt )
< (1− δ) (1− qˆ)(u
L − cL)
cH − uL + α(1− qˆ)(uL − cL)
uH − uL
uH − cH − α(1− qˆ)(uL − cL)
< (1− δ)(1− qˆ)(u
L − cL)
cH − uL
(
uH − uL
uH − cH − (1− qˆ)(uL − cL)
)
= (1− δ) u
L − cL
cH − uL 
where the equality is obtained by substituting qˆ = (cH − cL)/(uH − cL). Using this in-
equality and inequality (13) above we have
ρHt + ρLt = ρHt + (1− αρHt )
qHt+1 − qHt
αqHt+1(1− qHt )
< ρHt + (1− αρHt )(1− δ)
uL − cL
cH − uL
= ρHt
(
1− α(1− δ) u
L − cL
cH − uL
)
+ (1− δ) u
L − cL
cH − uL
<
1− δ
αδ
uL − cL
cH − uL
(
1− α(1− δ) u
L − cL
cH − uL
)
+ (1− δ) u
L − cL
cH − uL
= 1− δ
αδ
uL − cL
cH − uL
(
1− α(1− δ) u
L − cL
cH − uL + αδ
)
<
1− δ
αδ
uL − cL
cH − uL (1+ αδ)
= (1+ αδ)(1− δ)(c
H − cL)
cH − uL
ρ¯
αδ
(by (F.1)) < 1
As for t = T − 1, we have
ρHT−1 + ρLT−1 = ρHT−1 + (1− αρHT−1)
u(qˆ)− cH −φT−1
αqˆ(uH − cH −φT−1) 
Rearranging yields
ρHT−1 + ρLT−1 = ρHT−1
(
1− u(qˆ)− c
H −φT−1
qˆ(uH − cH −φT−1)
)
+ u(qˆ)− c
H −φT−1
αqˆ(uH − cH −φT−1) 
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Substituting for ρHT−1 from (8) and using that φ¯ = (1 − qˆ)(uL − cL) = u(qˆ) − cH and
φT−1 = αδφ¯, gives
ρHT−1 + ρLT−1 =
1− δ
αδ
uL − cL
cH − uL + αδφ¯
(
qˆ(uH − cH − αδφ¯)− (u(qˆ)− cH − αδφ¯)
qˆ(uH − cH − αδφ¯)
)
+ φ¯− αδφ¯
αqˆ(uH − cH − αδφ¯) 
Since
qˆ(uH − cH − αδφ)− (u(qˆ)− cH − αδφ)
= qˆ(uH − cH − αδφ)− (qˆuH + (1− qˆ)uL)+ cH + αδφ
= (1− qˆ)(cH − uL + αδφ)
then
ρHT−1 + ρLT−1 =
1− δ
αδqˆ(uH − cH − αδφ¯)
×
(
(uL − cL)(1− qˆ)(cH − uL + αδφ¯)
cH − uL + αδφ¯ + δφ¯(1− αδ)
)
= (1− δ)[1+ δ(1− αδ)]φ¯
αδqˆ(uH − cH − αδφ¯) 
Hence ρHT−1 + ρLT−1 < 1 if and only if
(1− δ)[1+ δ(1− αδ)]φ¯ < αδqˆ(uH − cH − αδφ¯)
i.e.,
[1− αδ2(1− αqˆ)]φ¯ < αδqˆ(uH − cH)
Since
qˆ
φ¯
(uH − cH)= qˆ
1− qˆ
uH − cH
uL − cL =
cH − cL
uH − cH
uH − cH
uL − cL =
1
ρ¯

then this inequality becomes
1− αδ2(1− αqˆ) < αδ
ρ¯

which holds since αδ/ρ¯ > 1 by (F.1) and 0<αδ2(1− αqˆ) < 1.
The surplus can be calculated using (1), (7), and L1.2 as
SDME = mBV B1 +mHV H1 +mLV L1
= (mL +mH)φ1 +mL(uL − cL −φ1) (14)
= mHφ1 +mL(uL − cL)
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Equations (8) and (9) and P2.2 identify ρH as given in P3.1. Equations (10), (12), and (11)
identify ρL as given in P3.2. Equation (2) identifies rH as given in P3.3. Equations (4) and
(5) identify rL as given in P3.4. The traders’ payoffs are identified in (1) and (7), and in
L1.2. The surplus is given in (14).
Finally, as the construction above shows, the profile defined in P3.1–P3.4 of Proposi-
tion 3 is indeed a DME. 
Proof of Proposition 4. The unique DME as well as the traders’ payoffs and the sur-
plus are given in Proposition 3. By P3.1,
lim
δ→1
ρH1 = 0= ρ˜H1
and
lim
δ→1
ρHt = lim
δ→1
1− δ
αδ
uL − cL
cH − uL + αδT−t(1− qˆ)(uL − cL) = 0= ρ˜
H
t
for 1< t < T , and also
lim
δ→1
ρHT = lim
δ→1
uL − cL −φT−1
αδ(cH − cL) =
uL − cL − αφ¯
α(cH − cL) = ρ˜
H
T 
Since uH > uL > cL by assumption, then 0< ρ˜HT < 1.
From (3) we have
lim
δ→1
qHt = lim
δ→1
cH − uL +φt
uH − uL =
cH − uL + αφ¯
uH − uL
for 1< t < T . Also qHT = qˆ implies
lim
δ→1
qHT = qˆ
Proposition P3.2 implies
lim
δ→1
ρL1 = lim
δ→1
cH − uL +φ2 − qH(uH − uL)
α(1− qH)(cH − uL +φ2) =
cH − uL + αφ¯− qH(uH − uL)
α(1− qH)(cH − uL + αφ¯) = ρ˜
L
1 
and for 1< t < T − 1,
lim
δ→1
ρLt = lim
δ→1
(1− αρHt )
(1− δ)φt+1
cH − uL +φt+1
uH − uL
uH − cH −φt = 0= ρ˜
L
t
and
lim
δ→1
ρLT−1 = lim
δ→1
(1− αρHT−1)
(1− αδ)(u(qˆ)− cH)
αqˆ(uH − cH −φT−1) =
(1− α)(u(qˆ)− cH)
αqˆ(uH − cH − αφ¯) = ρ˜
L
T−1
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Also
lim
δ→1
ρLT = lim
δ→1
(1− ρHT )= 1− ρ˜HT = ρ˜LT 
Thus, ρ˜HT < 1 implies ρ˜
L
T > 0.
As for the traders’ expected utilities, we have
lim
δ→1
V B1 = lim
δ→1
φ1 = αφ¯= V˜ B1
and
lim
δ→1
V L1 = lim
δ→1
(1− αδT−1(1− qˆ))(uL − cL)= (1− α(1− qˆ))(uL − cL)= V˜ L1 
Since V Ht = 0, then
lim
δ→1
V Ht = 0= V˜ Ht 
It is easy to check that (ρ˜H ρ˜L r˜H r˜L) forms an equilibrium of the market when
δ= 1.
Finally, we have
lim
δ→1
SDME = lim
δ→1
[mL(uL − cL)+mHδT−1α(1− qˆ)(uL − cL)]
= mL(uL − cL)+mHα(1− qˆ)(uL − cL)
= S˜DME 
Proof of Proposition 5. If frictions are not large, then the unique DME is that given
in Proposition 3. Thus, since limT→∞φt = 0 for all t, we have
lim
T→∞
ρH1 = 0= ρˆH1 
and for t > 1we have
lim
T→∞
ρHt = (1− δ)
uL − cL
αδ(cH − uL) = ρˆ
H
t 
Also
lim
T→∞
ρL1 =
cH − uL − qH(uH − uL)
α(1− qH)(cH − uL) =
q¯− qH
αq¯(1− qH) = ρˆ
L
1 
and for t > 1 we have
lim
T→∞
ρLt = 0= ρˆLt 
Clearly limT→∞ rHt = cH = rˆHt and limT→∞ rLt = uL = rˆLt .
We show that the strategy distribution (ρˆH ρˆL rˆH rˆL) forms a DME when T = ∞.
Since α(1 − qH)q¯ > q¯ − qH , then 0< ρˆL1 < 1. Since α < 1 and αδ(cH − cL) > uL − cL by
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(F.1), we have
αδ(cH − uL)+ δ(uL − cL) > αδ(cH − uL)+ αδ(uL − cL)= αδ(cH − cL) > uL − cL
Hence 0< ρˆHt < 1 for all t > 1.
Since rˆHt = cH and rˆLt = uL, then the (maximum) expected utility of high quality sell-
ers is Vˆ Ht = 0 for all t. Hence rˆHt = cH for all t satisfies (DMEH). For t > 1 the expected
utility of low quality sellers is
Vˆ Lt =
uL − cL
δ

For t = 1 we have rˆL1 = cL + δVˆ L2 = uL. Hence rˆLt = uL for all t satisfies (DMEL). Also
Vˆ L1 = αρˆL1 (uL − cL)+ (1− αρˆL1 )δVˆ L2 = uL − cL
Using ρˆH1 and ρˆ
L
1 we have
qH2 =
qH
qH + (1− αρˆL1 )(1− qH)
= q¯
And since ρˆLt = 0 for t > 1, then qHt = qH2 = q¯. Hence
qHt (u
H − cH)+ (1− qHt )(uL − cH)= 0
for t > 1, and therefore offering the high price (cH ) leads to zero instantaneous payoff for
all t > 1. Since qH1 < q¯ by assumption, then offering the high price (c
H ) at t = 1 leads to
a negative instantaneous payoff. Also since rˆLt = uL for all t, then offering the low price
(uL) yields a zero instantaneous payoff. Thus, the buyers maximum expected utility is
zero at all dates, i.e., Vˆ Bt = 0 for all t. Hence (DME.B) is satisfied. 
Proof of Corollary 3. We calculate the present value (PV) of a subsidy σL > 0 on low
quality, which we denote for δ < 1 by PVσL(δ), and show that it approaches σ
LmL from
below as δ approaches 1. We have
PVσL(δ)= σLαρL1mL1 +
∞∑
t=2
δt−1σLαρHt mLt 
Since ρHt is independent of t for t > 1 by P5.1, denote ρ
H
t = ρH . Also, we have mL1 = mL
and mLt = (1− αρL1 )(1− αρH)t−2mL for t > 1. Hence
PVσL(δ) = σLmL
(
αρL1 + αρH(1− αρL1 )
∞∑
t=2
δt−1(1− αρH)t−2
)
= σLmL
(
αρL1 + αρH(1− αρL1 )
∞∑
t=1
δt(1− αρH)t−1
)

638 Moreno and Wooders Theoretical Economics 11 (2016)
Since
∞∑
t=1
δt(1− αρH)t−1 = 1
(1− αρH)
∞∑
t=1
(δ(1− αρH))t
= 1
(1− αρH)
δ(1− αρH)
1− δ(1− αρH)
= δ
1− δ(1− αρH)
then
PVσL(δ)= σLmLP(δ)
where
P(δ) := αρL1 + (1− αρL1 )
αδρH
αδρH + (1− δ) 
Since 0< αρL1 < 1 and δ < 1, then P(δ) is a convex combination of 1 and a number less
than 1. Therefore P(δ) < 1 and PVσL(δ) < σ
LmL. Further, since limδ→1 P(δ) = 1, then
limδ→1 PVσL(δ)= σLmL. 
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